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1. Introduction 
The fundamental premise of this paper is that efficiency wages and retention standards are 
related. Whilst the majority of efficiency wage literature has concentrated on imperfect 
monitoring of effort, we leave monitoring technologies aside and focus instead on the 
underlying output required by the firm; that is, the minimum standard a worker must deliver 
to continue his employment relationship with the firm. If wages determine effort and effort 
determines output, and if a firing standard is the critical level of output below which a worker 
will be fired, then it follows that wages and standards will be related. So, in a world where 
firms are able to observe worker output but not underlying worker effort, and where output in 
turn is a function of both luck (i.e. noise) and effort, there must exist a critical level of output 
below which the worker cannot possibly be exerting the required effort. We take this critical 
level to be the dividing line between a worker’s retention and dismissal. If the worker’s 
output falls short of this standard, then he is fired; if it equals or exceeds the standard, then he 
is retained and paid the going wage at the firm. It then follows that the higher the wage, the 
higher the equilibrium level of effort and the higher the standard required of workers.  
The central tenet of efficiency wage theory is that wages and effort are positively 
correlated. In what follows we present a stochastic shirking model in which the robustness of 
this relationship is tested. If standards, effort and detection probabilities are interdependent, 
then a sufficiently low standard will ensure that all workers are retained, albeit at low wages 
and effort. The higher the standard, the higher the required effort and the higher the risk of 
being detected shirking. By relaxing the literature’s common assumption of exogenous 
shirking detection probabilities and considering instead the more general and endogenous 
case in which shirking detection depends upon equilibrium effort, we show that the positive 
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supply-side relationship between efficiency wages and effort is no longer guaranteed.1 Such a 
failure may arise when both the cost of effort and the probability of detection are positively 
correlated with effort but where the former (latter) is positively (negatively) correlated to the 
wage. This result echoes findings in the monitoring literature and is potentially troubling for 
efficiency wage theory. However, we demonstrate that in our case this is purely a supply side 
issue. For when we consider the demand-side we find the efficiency wage being set in a 
region where the elasticity of the detection probability with respect to effort is less than unity, 
implying that in equilibrium effort does indeed depend positively on the wage. 
In what follows we focus on a fixed wage contract with a set output standard. 
Workers are dismissed if they breach the contract by failing to perform to the standard set. 
Whilst this type of contract is common in the labour market, there are alternatives.2 These 
can be broadly divided into contracts where rewards and punishments depend upon either: (i) 
absolute performance - for example, a piece rate in its purest form or other more complicated 
performance related pay schemes;3 or (ii) relative performance – for example, the tournament 
models espoused originally by Lazear and Rosen (1981)].  
We do not focus on the comparative merits of standards versus alternative 
performance contracts as investigated by, amongst others, Gibbons and Waldmann (1999) 
and Ghosh and Waldmann (2010). Instead we offer a novel approach that combines standards 
with efficiency wages. Most efficiency wage models shy away from standards, though there 
are exceptions. Akerlof (1982), for example, seeks to rationalise why workers would perform 
beyond a pre-prescribed standard by appealing to gift exchange. We provide a different 
																																								 																				
1 Whilst some authors have focussed on the endogenous detection rates that arise through monitoring [see, for 
example, Calvo and Wellisz (1978) for an early example and Ewing and Payne (1999) for an empirical 
implementation] we consider instead the endogeneity issues that arise from the choice of effort. 
2 For a survey on contracts and how they operate in practice, see Malcomson (1997, 1999). For a theoretical 
exposition of incentives in the labour market and how such incentives affect payment contracts, see Prendercast 
(1999). 
3 The study of piece rates is voluminous and has a long tradition. For early examples see Gibbons (1987) and 
Lazear (1986). 
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perspective; by appealing to efficiency wages in the presence of idiosyncratic productivity 
shocks. In our model we set out the conditions under which non-shirkers will perform at or 
beyond a set standard, and show how this will at times distinguish them from shirkers. 
Conventional efficiency wage theory has traditionally modelled worker effort as the 
outcome of binary choice decision; workers either shirk by supplying zero effort or they work 
by exerting the required level of effort. We take a broader view and model effort as a 
continuum that can be exerted whether working or shirking. We interpret shirking as a 
neglection of duty by underperforming relative to a required effort level. It encompasses both 
the conventional zero effort view as well as the more general case of under-exertion in 
relation to the firm’s effort norm.4 Our model is therefore closely related to those of Walsh 
(1999), Goerke (2001), Allgulin and Ellingsen (2002) and Strobl and Walsh (2007), all of 
whom also assume continuous effort.5 By so doing, these authors demonstrate that the trade 
off between monitoring and wages found in the binary effort dual labour market models of 
Bulow and Summers (1986) does not automatically transfer to the case where effort is 
continuous. We differ from these authors, however, by concentrating on standards rather than 
monitoring. Our approach opens up a new series of results linking standards to effort and the 
probability of detection. Thus, we demonstrate that shirking declines when standards are 
raised. Intuitively, higher standards increase the probability of detection for a given level of 
effort. As a result, shirkers, who optimise their trade-off between the cost of effort and the 
risk of being identified, increase their effort in response to the increase in detection 
probability. 
A question worth asking is under what circumstances will a required minimum 
standard be the appropriate mechanism to trigger dismissal. Is it not possible that firms could 
																																								 																				
4 Our focus is on standards rather than the psychological norms discussed in relation to unemployment and the 
labour market by Akerlof (1980) and Clark (2003).  
5 Hahm and Mayer (2011) show in a model of efficiency wages and search that even when effort is binary it is 
possible that monitoring (or detection rates) and wages are not necessarily substitutes.  
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use relative performance to dismiss employees? This would certainly appear to be the usual 
practice in team sports where athletes who underperform relative to their teammates face 
termination of their contracts. It follows from this that an alternative modelling strategy, in 
which relative performance plays a more prominent role, might be to adapt a tournament 
model in the Lazear and Rosen (1981) tradition to incentivise workers through punishment 
rather than reward; i.e. where relatively poor performing workers are sacked. From an 
economic perspective it makes sense for the firm to evoke such a firing trigger strategy if 
performance is noisy but all employers face the same aggregate unobserved shock. On the 
other hand, if shocks are idiosyncratic rather than common, as in our model, then 
tournaments are dominated by contracts as initially demonstrated by Green and Stokey 
(1982). Our paper therefore does not follow the tournament route but is more akin to the 
literature on standards or thresholds as part of incentive schemes. Although these have been 
typically ignored in the efficiency wage literature, they have a long tradition elsewhere. For 
instance, an early exposition by Mirrlees (1974) investigates how it might be optimal to 
punish agents who do not attain a given performance threshold. There is also a growing 
literature relating to bonuses, emanating from Healy (1985), in which CEO’s seek to shift 
earnings (i.e. output performance) to later periods whenever performance exceeds an upper 
threshold.6 	
It is apparent from the above discussion that whether relative or absolute performance 
is the chosen measurement criteria for dismissal depends on the nature of shocks and the 
underlying economic reasoning. However, it is not the whole story since legal frameworks 
and employment law may also play important roles. There are varying limitations across 
different judicial regions on when you can fire workers - see, for instance, Blau and Kahn 
(1999) for a discussion of employment-protection legislation that makes it costly or difficult 
																																								 																				
6 For an exposition on how bonuses relate to two thresholds - a lower one where bonuses kick in and a higher 
one where bonuses are capped - see Murphy (1999, 2013) and Murphy and Jensen (2011). 
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for employers to terminate jobs without cause. If such legislation is enforced and absolute 
standards of performance are used in court or in industrial tribunals, then these legal 
restrictions may suggest that absolute standards in firing may be more appropriate than 
relative performance criteria to determine dismissals. Thus, absolute performance measures 
may be particularly applicable to legal jurisdictions with extensive employment protection, 
such as the original member countries of the European Union. The legal argument for 
absolute performance may apply to a lesser extent in the United States where the general rule 
is that firms have the right to fire at will, although even here unjust firing laws exists. 
We proceed in Section 2 to develop a model which maintains an absolute standard of 
acceptable worker related output, below which workers are fired, to investigate the 
interdependent effects of standards, effort, wages and the probability of shirker detection. In 
Section 3 we conclude. 
2. The Model 
We present an efficiency wage model in the Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) tradition that is 
extended to include a stochastic element. We consider the case where the firm observes 
worker output but where output is a function of both worker effort and an idiosyncratic 
stochastic shock. Workers are retained and paid the efficiency wage providing their observed 
output does not fall below a defined standard. Given our focus of endogenising the 
probability of detecting shirking behaviour, we do not model the unemployment 
consequences of the efficiency wage on the wider labour market.  
To conceptualise the informational context of our model it is helpful to consider the 
time sequence for each period t illustrated in Figure 1 following: 
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Figure 1: The Informational Context in Each Time Period 
In Stage 1, for each period t, the contract variables are set by the firm vis. the wage and 
standard. In Stage 2 an effort level is chosen by the worker but is not necessarily known by 
the firm. After effort is chosen the worker experiences an idiosyncratic shock to his 
productivity in Stage 3, which the firm cannot observe. Output, however, is realised as and is 
common knowledge in Stage 4. Finally, in Stage 5, a worker is remunerated if output at least 
equals the standard and is dismissed otherwise.  
Formally, we assume that workers are identical, risk neutral and endowed with a 
separable utility function,  u w,e( ) = w− c e( ) , where w and 0,e e+⎡ ⎤∈⎣ ⎦  denote income and 
worker effort respectively and where ( )c ⋅  is a continuous and convex cost function with 
( ) ( ) 0dc e de c e′≡ > ,  d
2c e( ) de2 ≡ ′′c e( ) > 0  and ( ) ( )0 0 0c c′= = .7 Each worker is 
associated with a stochastic output function, ( )i iy f eθ= , which varies with state i. Workers 
																																								 																				
7 Note that the function ( )c e eα= Α , where 1α > , which naturally embeds the quadratic cost function, satisfies 
these conditions.  
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choose effort prior to the realisation of this output shock and technology is such that 
 df e( ) / de ≡ ′f e( ) > 0 ,  d 2 f e( ) / de2 ≡ ′′f e( ) < 0 , ( )0 0f =  and ( )0f ′ =∞ . The shift-
parameter, iθ , represents a random shock to productivity in state i and is uniformly 
distributed between Lθ  and H Lθ θ> . For an individual worker iθ  reflects relative misfortune 
(when it is low) or luck (when it is high).  
The firm’s objective is to maximise per-worker expected profit, ( ){ }i f e wπ θ= −Ε , 
subject to providing the worker with at least his outside option (e.g. unemployment 
insurance) utility b w< .8 Writing this participation constraint as: 
 
 
u wr ,e( ) = wr − c e( ) = b
⇒
wr = wr b,e( ) = c e( ) + b
  (1) 
yields an inverse function in which the reservation wage, rw , depends on effort and the 
outside option. The nature of this relationship is ascertained from totally differentiating 
expression (1) vis:  dw
r de ≡ we
r b,e( ) = ′c e( ) > 0 ;  d 2wr de2 ≡ weer b,e( ) = ′′c e( ) > 0 ; 
( ), 1 0r rbdw db w b e≡ = >  and ( )2 2 , 0r rbbd w db w b e≡ = , Thus, the firm’s profit maximising 
level of effort, e∗ , is defined implicitly from: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , , 0e i eb e b e f e w b ee
π
π θ∗ ∗ ∗
∂
′= = − =
∂
  (2) 
The problem facing the firm is that whilst it is able to observe worker output, it is unable to 
observe either worker effort, e, or ‘luck’, iθ . Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to assume that 
in some instances effort can be partially deduced. To reflect this, consider the case where the 
firm sets a ‘standard’; that is, a minimum level of output,  !y , that the worker must attain in 
																																								 																				
8 Note that we have normalised the product price to equal unity for the sake of simplicity. 
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order to be retained in the workplace, determined by the lowest possible output produced by a 
non-shirking worker.9 We define a critical realisation to a shirker of the random shock,  !θ , 
below which shirking (i.e. supplying less than required effort) will always be detected. 
Formally, we assume: 
 
!y = θL f e
∗( ) = !θ f e( )  (3) 
where  e∗  denotes the firm’s choice level of effort and  e < e∗  denotes the ‘shirking’ level of 
effort. It thus follows that the worst case scenario when the worker supplies the firm’s desired 
level of effort in the least favourable state of nature defines implicitly a critical state of nature 
at which anything less than required effort will be detected. The critical state therefore 
satisfies: 
 
!θ ≡ !θ e ,e∗( ) = θL f e
∗( )
f e( )  (4) 
It is apparent that the critical state is increasing in the firm’s desired level of effort and 
decreasing in shirking effort: 
 
∂ !θ
∂e∗
≡ !θ
e∗
e ,e∗( ) = θL ′f e
∗( )
f e( ) > 0  (5) 
 
∂ !θ
∂e
≡ !θe e ,e
∗( ) = −θL f e
∗( ) ′f e( )
f e( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
2 < 0   (6) 
Intuitively, a higher desired level of effort,  e∗ , on the part of the firm raises the acceptable bar 
of output performance (i.e. the standard  y ) resulting in more states in which shirking is 
																																								 																				
9 Thus, no non-shirking worker will be fired though some shirking workers could survive. Proposition 1 and 
Corollary 1 to follow, determine the conditions for when setting such a standard is optimal for the firm. 
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identifiable. Thus, the temptation to shirk declines with the equilibrium level of non-shirking 
effort as potential shirkers can expect to be detected more frequently and must hence hope for 
a higher realisation of luck to avoid being dismissed.  
 These assumptions are represented in Figure 2 and Figure 3 following. Recalling that 
both a shirker and a non-shirker choose their effort level prior to the realisation of the state of 
the world, the figures reflect possible output levels. The two upward sloping lines in Figure 2 
depict the outputs generated by a shirking worker, ( )i iy f eθ= , and a non-shirking worker, 
 
yi
∗ = θ i f e
∗( ) . Since the firm is only able to observe output, but not its constituent elements 
(i.e. effort and luck), it is unable to distinguish between a shirker whose productivity 
realisation is  
!θ e ,e∗( )  and a non-shirker whose productivity realisation is at the lower bound 
 θL . More generally, the firm is unable to detect shirking at any productivity realisation 
 
θ i ≥ !θ e ,e
∗( ) . Shirking is, however, detectable at any productivity realisation  θ i < !θ e ,e∗( )  
since the revenue from shirking here falls short of the lowest output possible for a non-
shirker.  
In terms of Figure 3, an increase in the equilibrium non-shirking level of effort from 
 e0
∗  to  e1
∗ > e0
∗ , which is equivalent to an increase in the standard from  y0  to  y1 > y0 , increases 
the critical shift parameter from 
 
!θ e ,e0
∗( )  to  !θ e ,e1∗( ) > !θ e ,e0∗( ) . Thus, as the lowest possible 
output for non-shirkers increases, potential shirkers need to be even luckier to avoid 
detection.  
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Figure 2: Critical ‘Luck’ 
 
Figure 3: Critical ‘Luck’ and Effort 
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Let us depart for the time being from the case where the standard is set and restricted by (3), 
and instead consider the case where the firm can set any standard  y , where  y  does not 
necessarily equal  !y . In this context, consider the worker’s decision problem over effort vis. 
supplying the effort required to attain the standard or supplying a lower (i.e. shirking) level of 
effort. We now allow for both type-1 and type-2 errors such that shirking (non-shirking) 
workers may be inadvertently retained (fired). The supply of effort from non-shirking 
workers will be determined by an incentive compatible ‘non-shirking constraint’ (NSC). This 
specifies the lowest wage a worker will accept in return for supplying a given level of effort 
or, equivalently, the maximum effort the worker will supply for a given wage. Intuitively, 
workers will provide the firm’s required level of effort, e∗ , if the expected utility from so 
doing is at least as great as that from shirking. The NSC is thus: 
 
1− pˆ( )w+ pˆb− c e∗( ) ≥ pb+ 1− p( )w− c e( )   (7) 
where p  and pˆ  denote respectively the probabilities that a shirker and non-shirker are fired. 
The dismissal probability for a non-shirker given a standard y is: 
 
pˆ =
0 if y ≤ !y
θn
c −θL
θH −θL
otherwise
⎧
⎨
⎪⎪
⎩
⎪
⎪
 (8) 
where ( )cn y f eθ ∗=  denotes the critical state at which non-shirkers are fired given the 
standard y . The dismissal probability for a shirker is given by: 
 
p =
0 if y ≤ yL
θs
c −θL
θH −θL
otherwise
1 if y ≥ yH
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪
⎪
 (9) 
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where ( )L Ly f eθ= , ( )H Hy f eθ=  and  θs
c = y f e( )  denotes the critical state at which non-
shirkers are fired given a standard y .  
Satisfaction of the NSC implies an incentive compatible (i.e. efficiency) wage 
schedule: 
( ) ( )
ˆ
c e c e
w b
p p
∗
∗
⎡ ⎤−
⎢ ⎥= +
−⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
  (10) 
The efficiency wage, w∗ , is the lowest wage compatible with the provision of a given level of 
non-shirking effort  e∗ . It is increasing in the worker’s outside unemployment opportunity, b , 
and effort cost, ( ).c , since the firm will have to pay more to induce effort when alternative 
employment prospects are good and when the supply of effort is more onerous. The wage is 
also increasing in the probability, pˆ , of high effort workers being inadvertently sacked. In 
contrast, the wage is decreasing in the probability, p , of the correct detection of shirkers with 
workers becoming more wary of shirking as the risk of detection increases. Since both of 
these probabilities are functions of the standard, a potential trade-off emerges.  
The trade-off can be seen graphically in Figure 2. Should the firm choose to set a 
standard  y = !y  then it would retain all non-shirkers whilst unlucky shirkers would be fired. If 
the standard is set above  !y  such that  y > !y  then the probability of shirkers being fired 
increases. The shirkers would in essence need to ride their luck more often. Thus the firm 
would not retain the low effort workers as often. However, the firm would now start making 
firing mistakes in the sense that it would on occasion fire the wrong type of worker; the high 
effort non-shirkers. Whilst there might be an advantage in raising the standard above  !y  to 
punish the shirkers more often, there is an associated cost of unfairly punishing hard working 
employees. There is no advantage of increasing the standard above  y
H  as all shirkers will 
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then have already been fired. There is on the other hand no point in having a standard below 
 !y  as the firm would simply be punishing the shirkers less often whilst retaining all non-
shirkers. Thus the range of operative standards must be 
 
y ∈ !y, yH⎡⎣ ) . Clearly, no standards 
will be set outside this range.  
It is apparent from Figure 3 that the range of possible standards 
 
!y, yH⎡⎣ )  is a function 
of the non-shirkers effort level. Consider the case where we for simplicity assume a fixed 
level of shirking effort such that the output idiosyncratic shock level (the upward sloping 
curve) of shirkers remains fixed. Now let the non-shirkers experience an exogenous change in 
their effort level such that their upward sloping output-luck locus shifts leftward and up. At 
any given luck realisation the non-shirkers output increases. This implies that shirkers will on 
average have to be luckier to be retained by the firm since the critical output  !y  increases; 
 !y : !y0→ !y1  with higher effort. Thus the range of possible standards shrinks.  
Assuming that the firm sets a standard 
 
!y = θL f e
∗( ) , such that only shirking workers 
are fired, then the probability of a shirker being detected and fired is given by: 
 
p !θ e ,e∗( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ ≡
!y f e( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ −θL
θH −θL
=
!θ e ,e∗( )−θL
θH −θL
=
θL
θH −θL
f e∗( )
f e( ) −1
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
 (11) 
In this case, the worker’s decision problem regarding effort is given by: 
 
max
e
Ε u w,e( ){ } = p !θ e ,e∗( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦b+ 1− p !θ e ,e∗( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦{ }w− c e( )  (12) 
where: 
 
p !θ e ,e∗( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ =
0 if e ≥ e∗
θL
θH −θL
f e∗( )
f e( ) −1
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
otherwise
⎧
⎨
⎪⎪
⎩
⎪
⎪
  (13) 
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Clearly, there will either be an interior (i.e. shirking) or corner (i.e. non-shirking) solution to 
this maximisation problem. If the former, then the worker’s optimal choice of effort, e , is 
derived implicitly from the first order condition: 
 
∂Ε u w,e( ){ }
∂e
=
′f e( )
f e( )2
θL f e
∗( )
θH −θL( )
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
w− b( )− ′c e( ) = 0
⇒
′f e( )
f e( )2
θL f e
∗( )
θH −θL( )
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
w− b( ) = ′c e( )
 (14) 
Intuitively, a potential shirker will provide effort up to the point at which the marginal benefit 
from so doing, namely the reduction in the probability of losing the rent of wages over 
unemployment insurance, equals the marginal cost of increasing effort. 
Assuming 
 
!y = θL f e
∗( ) , then the worker’s NSC reduces to: 
 
w− c e∗( ) ≥ p !θ e ,e∗( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦b+ 1− p !θ e ,e∗( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦{ }w− c e( )   (15) 
Satisfaction of the reduced NSC implies an incentive compatible (i.e. efficiency) wage 
schedule: 
 
w∗ = b+ p !θ e ,e∗( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
−1
c e∗( )− c e( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦   (16) 
The efficiency wage, w∗ , is the lowest wage compatible with the provision of a given level of 
non-shirking effort e∗  (i.e. the standard  !y ). It follows a similar intuition to expression (10).   
For instance, higher detection probabilities of shirkers still shade the necessary effort-
inducing wage that the firm is obliged to offer. 
Increasing the standard beyond the point at which only the shirkers are sacked to 
regions where non-shirkers also face unemployment risk will have an a priori ambiguous 
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effect on wages. However, consider the conditions under which the firm will not find it 
optimal to diverge from a standard where only shirkers are sacked. This occurs when non-
shirkers are always retained. Formally: 
Proposition 1: The firm will find it optimal to set the standard 
 
!y = θL f e
∗( )  iff 
0,  p y y∂ ∂ > ∀ and  
∂p ∂y( )− ∂ pˆ ∂y( ) < 0, ∀y > !y . 
Proof:  From expression (10) above it follows that the firm’s expected profit 
can be written: 
{ } ( ){ } ( ){ } ( ) ( )* * ˆi i
c e c e
f e w f e b
p p
π θ θ
∗
∗
⎡ ⎤−
⎢ ⎥= − = − −
−⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
Ε Ε Ε  (17) 
The firm will choose effort *e  and the standard y  to maximise 
profit.10 The latter choice variable yields the following first order total 
derivative: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
*
2 *
ˆ
ˆ
p y p y c e c ed e
dy e yp p
π π
∗⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦= + ⋅
∂ ∂−
 (18) 
where * 0eπ∂ ∂ =  from expression (2). It therefore follows that 
( ) ( ) ( )ˆsgn sgnd dy p y p yπ ⎡ ⎤= ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦ . From expression (8) we have 
ˆ 0p y∂ ∂ >  if  y ≤ !y . In addition, if  ∂p ∂y( )− ∂ pˆ ∂y( ) < 0, ∀y > !y
then: 
 
sgn dπ
dy
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
=
> 0 if y<!y
< 0 if y>!y
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎩⎪
 (19) 
With a continuous profit function it thus follows that expected profit is 
maximised at  y = !y . 
QED. 
Proposition 1’s dependence on ( ) ( )ˆp y p y∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂  may be given an intuitive explanation. 
Consider the efficiency wage schedule set out in expression (10) previously, where it follows 
that if the sign of ( ) ( )ˆp y p y∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂  is positive (negative) then an increase in the standard 
																																								 																				
10 Note that the firm is therefore also implicitly choosing the probabilities of being laid off as well as the 
efficiency wage. 
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will reduce (increase) the efficiency wage needed to ensure incentive compatibility. With the 
conditions of Proposition 1 it follows that when  y > !y , an increase in the standard will 
necessitate a higher efficiency wage such that the firm’s profit is declining in the standard. 
Conversely, an increase in the standard when  y < !y  will reduce the efficiency wage required 
to induce non-shirking such that the firm’s profit is increasing in the standard. It therefore 
follows that an increase in the standard will increase profits when y < !y  and decrease profits 
when  y > !y . It thus follows that the firm’s profits are maximised when the standard is set at 
 y = !y .  
 That is not all. Further insight follows from Proposition 1 by considering the 
elasticities of effort with respect to the standard for shirkers and non-shirkers: 
Corollary 1: The firm will find it optimal to set the standard 
 
!y = θL f e
∗( )  iff nε  is 
sufficiently small in comparison to  ε s , where  
εn ≡ ∂e
∗ ∂y( ) y e∗( )  and 
( )( )s e y y eε ≡ ∂ ∂  denote respectively the elasticity of non-shirking 
effort and shirking effort with respect to the standard. 
Proof: Note: 
( ) ( )
( )
( )2
1 ,s L H
H L
f e ef ep y y y
y f e
ε
θ θ
⎧ ⎫′−∂ ⎪ ⎪= ∀ ∈⎨ ⎬∂ − ⎡ ⎤⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
 (20) 
Thus,  ∂p ∂y > 0  iff  ε s ≤1. Similarly: 
 
∂ pˆ
∂y
=
0 if y ≤ !y
1
θH −θL
f e∗( )− e∗ ′f e∗( )εn
f e∗( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
2
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎩
⎪
⎫
⎬
⎪
⎭
⎪
othewise
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪
⎪
 (21) 
Thus, ˆ 0p y∂ ∂ >  if 1sε ≤ . Corollary 1 now follows directly from 
Proposition 1. 
QED 
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Proposition 1 puts in essence restrictions on how responsive in terms of effort shirkers are to 
standards as compared to non-shirkers.  Proposition 1 intuitively holds as long shirkers’ effort 
is sufficiently responsive to standards. We will henceforth assume that Proposition 1 and 
Corollary 1 hold such that the firm sets the standard as determined by expression (4).  
Assuming then that the firm sets a standard 
 
!y = θL f e
∗( )  such that only shirking 
workers are fired, then the probability of a shirker being detected and fired is therefore 
determined by expresson (11). In contrast to the conventional efficiency wage story, this 
probability is determined endogenously by the equilibrium level of effort. Indeed, we now 
derive: 
Proposition 2: The probability of detecting shirking depends positively on the 
equilibrium effort level of non-shirkers. 
Proof: Partial differentiation of expression (11) above yields 
 
∂p ∂e∗ = !θ
e∗
e ,e∗( ) θH −θL( )= θL ′f e∗( ) f e( ) θH −θL( ) > 0 . 
QED 
As Proposition 2 states and Figure 3 illustrates, the probability of detecting (and thus 
dismissing) a shirker increases with equilibrium effort since this raises the critical shift 
parameter, leaving the transgressor less states in which to hide. That is, workers who raise 
their effort level to the gratification of firms do so to the detriment of potential shirkers who 
are more readily identifiable. Proposition 2 thus stands in sharp contrast to previous literature 
in which effort and detection probabilities are unrelated.11 As equilibrium effort effectively 
determines the critical dismissal-retention output,  !y , we can also draw inferences between 
standards and the probability of detection. Thus, within an efficiency wage framework we 
find that increasing standards increases the probability of detection. This echoes the findings 
of Rasmusen and Zenger (1990) who, using a teamwork model of agency in the Holmstrom 
																																								 																				
11 Though not directly linked, Proposition 1 suggests a fair amount of introspection with respect to effort in 
relation to internal effort levels within the firm, not dissimilar to the discussion in Akerlof and Yellen (1990) 
and Danthine and Kurmann (2009) where the central theme is the relative wage within the firm as opposed to an 
external reference wage.  
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(1982) tradition, demonstrate that the probability of detecting shirking increases with the 
output target set.  
 The expected utility from shirking, which is detected only if  θ < !θ , is given by: 
( ) ( ) ( ), 1u e e pb p w c e∗ = + − −  (22) 
It can be shown that shirking workers will never provide zero effort. To be sure: 
Proposition 3: A shirking worker will operate in the region ( )0,e e∗∈ . 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
If the probability of detecting shirking is endogenous then it follows that shirkers will not 
necessarily exert zero effort, as is commonly assumed in the efficiency wage literature. 
Whilst shirkers by definition exert less effort than that required by the firm, they trade off the 
cost of effort against the reduction in the detection probability and do best by exerting at least 
some effort. 
 Note that if the standard is set sufficiently high, or the wage sufficiently low, then all 
(identical) workers will shirk - in the sense that they fail to provide the level of effort 
consistent with always attaining the standard set by the firm. They then will all run the risk of 
being fired. In this case we note: 
Proposition 4: When all workers shirk an increase in the wage will increase shirking 
effort such that 0de dw> . 
Proof: This can be demonstrated by totally differentiating the first-order 
utility maximising condition (given in the proof of Proposition 3) with 
respect to wages and effort. 
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de
dw
=
∂ p
∂e
∂2 p
∂e 2
b− w( )− ′′c e( )
⇒
de
dw
=
′f e( ) f e( )
′′f e( ) f e( )− 2 ′f e( )2⎡⎣⎢ ⎤⎦⎥ b− w( ) + ′′c e( ) f e( )
3 θH −θL( )
θL f e
∗( )
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
> 0
 (23) 
since: 
( )
( )
( )
( )2
0L
H L
f ef ep
e f e
θ
θ θ
∗⎡ ⎤′∂ ⎢ ⎥= − <
∂ −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (24) 
And: 
 
∂2 p
∂e 2
= −
′′f e( ) f e( )− 2 ′f e( )2
f e( )3
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
θL f e
∗( )
θH −θL( )
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
> 0  (25) 
QED. 
The conventional efficiency wage result that wages and effort are positively correlated is 
retained. Higher wages increase the fear of dismissal and induce shirkers to raise effort, albeit 
not necessarily to the required standard. 
We are now able to draw inferences as regards how shirkers react to standards within 
the firm and outside opportunities. 
Proposition 5: Shirkers will exert: (a) more effort the higher the standard, !y  (as 
reflected by a higher e∗ ) set by the firm; and (b) less effort the higher 
the outside option utility, b: 
Proof:  Part (a) can be demonstrated by totally differentiating the first-order 
utility maximising condition (given in the proof of Proposition 3) with 
respect to shirking effort,e , and standard (i.e. non-shirking) effort, e*: 
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de
de∗
= −
∂2 p
∂e ∂e∗
b− w( )
∂2 p
∂ !e2
b− w( )− ′′c e( )
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
⇒
de
de∗
= −
′f e∗( ) ′f e( ) f e( )θL b− w( )
ΦθL f e
∗( ) b− w( ) + ′′c e( ) f e( )3 θH −θL( )
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
> 0
 (26) 
where  Φ = ′′f e( ) f e( )− 2 ′f e( )
2 . Part (b) can similarly be proven by 
differentiating this condition with respect to shirking effort, e , and 
outside option utility, b, yielding: 
  
de
db
= −
∂ p
∂e
∂2 p
∂e 2
b− w( )− ′′c e( )
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
⇒
de
db
= −
′f e( ) f e( )
Φ b− w( ) + ′′c e( ) f e( )3 θH −θL( )θL f e∗( )
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
⎧
⎨
⎪⎪
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎫
⎬
⎪⎪
⎭
⎪
⎪
< 0
 (27) 
QED. 
Proposition 5 reflects the considerations a potential shirker makes with respect to the 
possibility of being detected and fired, and so forfeiting wages in exchange for 
unemployment utility. Increasing the standard,  !y  (i.e. raising the required non-shirking effort 
level e∗ ), as in part (a), is equivalent to the firm becoming less tolerant as regards low output. 
Thus, the probability of a shirker being detected is effectively increased as result of the firm’s 
higher standards. To countervail this effect, the shirker responds by increasing effort. The 
penalty of being detected is simply the difference between the wage if employed and 
unemployment utility if fired. Any increase in the latter, as in part (b), will have an adverse 
effect on effort. This is a common result in the traditional shirking literature, where typically 
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no one shirks in equilibrium. The novel aspect here is that this result translates into a situation 
where some or all workers shirk.12 
Returning to expression (16), it follows that since both the cost of effort and the 
probability of detection of shirkers are positively correlated with effort but oppositely (i.e. 
cost of effort - positively; probability of detection – negatively) correlated with the wage, 
that a new complexity has arisen whereby the relationship between the incentive compatible 
wage and effort is not unambiguously positive. To be sure: 
Proposition 6: A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for the positive supply-side 
correlation between the (efficiency) wage and (non-shirking) effort (i.e. 
0e w∗ ∗∂ ∂ > ) is that the elasticity of the probability of detection of 
shirkers with respect to non-shirking effort, η
∗ , is less than unity.  
Proof:  From expression (16) it follows that: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1p pe
e p pe
w c e c e c e c e e c e c eη∗
∗ ∗
∗ ∂∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
∂
∂ = =
∂ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤′ ′− − − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 (28) 
where ( )( ) 0p e e pη∗ ∗ ∗= ∂ ∂ >  denotes the elasticity of the probability 
of detection with respect to effort and 
 
p ≡ p !θ e ,e∗( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ . Since 
( ) ( ) 0c e e c e∗ ∗ ∗′ − >  by the convexity of the cost function, the proposition 
follows.13 
QED. 
Proposition 6 illustrates a potential fissure in the positive link between efficiency wages and 
effort. Only by constraining the effect of effort on the probability of detection to be relatively 
small as compared to the effect of effort on the worker’s cost (i.e. disutility of effort), are we 
																																								 																				
12 This is in the tradition of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) - hereafter SS - where no worker shirks in equilibrium. 
However, unlike SS – see following - we make no inference about the involuntary unemployment implications 
of the efficiency wage  w∗ : ‘From the worker’s point of view, unemployment is involuntary: those without jobs 
would be happy to work at  w∗  or lower, but cannot make a credible promise not to shirk at such wages.’ [SS 
(1984), p. 438]. Whilst we recognise that the higher (non-shirking) wage in our model may induce involuntary 
unemployment, as the unemployed workers outside the firm would prefer to work at the firm, it is not the focus 
of our paper. 
13 Proposition 5 contains a sufficiency but not a necessary requirement since effort may rise with the wage even 
if 1η∗ >  when ( )c ⋅  is sufficiently convex or when the difference between shirking and non-shirking effort is 
sufficiently small. 
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able to retain the intuitively attractive positive correlation between the supply of effort and 
wages. This condition resembles those in Walsh (1999) and Strobl and Walsh (2007), both of 
whom find that whether wages are positively or negatively related to the level of monitoring 
depends critically on the shape of the worker’s effort supply curve and, in particular, whether 
the elasticity of the worker’s disutility of effort is increasing or decreasing in effort. The 
intuition behind Proposition 6 is simple and is found in a clear-cut interpretation of the 
efficiency wage schedule given by expression (16). The efficiency wage is greater the higher 
is the required non-shirking effort and the lower is the probability of shirker detection. If the 
shirkers response to non-shirker effort is sufficiently elastic it follows that the positive 
correlation between effort and wages can be broken. Thus, Proposition 6, viewed in isolation, 
raises concerns over the central efficiency wage tenet of a positive correlation between wages 
and effort. 
The concern deepens when, in a similar manner, we draw conclusions regarding the 
level of non-shirker effort exertion and changes in unemployment insurance: 
Proposition 7: A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for the negative supply-side 
correlation between unemployment insurance and (non-shirking) effort 
(i.e. 0e b∗∂ ∂ < ) is that the elasticity of the probability of detection with 
respect to the latter, η
∗ , is less than unity.  
Proof: The proof follows the proof of Proposition 6 closely and is therefore 
omitted. 
QED. 
Thus, and contrary to previous efficiency literature, we are no longer certain that higher 
unemployment insurance results in lower effort. As was the case for Proposition 6, this can 
be given some simple intuition through expression (16). The effort at a given efficiency wage 
should fall with the level of unemployment benefits, as long as the probability of detection of 
shirkers remain constant. However, the probability of detection does not remain unchanged, 
and herein lies the breakdown of the standard result. 
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We now turn to the firm’s behaviour when it sets standards at such a level that no 
workers shirk in equilibrium. The analysis surrounding Propositions 6 and 7 is supply driven; 
rather than tying down a particular wage-effort combination, it investigated an incentive 
compatible locus of wage and effort combinations. To identify the equilibrium level of effort 
and the efficient wage from this locus, we turn to the demand side where the firm maximises 
profits subject to workers behaving according to their previously determined supply (i.e. pay-
effort) schedule. Thus, armed with the knowledge of how workers respond in terms of effort 
to changes in pay, the firm will set the level of compensation that maximises profit. We now 
derive: 
Proposition 8: The firm will always choose an operational wage such that 
0e w∗ ∗∂ ∂ > . 
Proof From (2) and (27) it follows that: 
 
∂π
∂e∗
= θ i ′f e
∗( )− ′c e
∗( )− c e∗( )− c e( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ ∂ p∂e∗
p2
= 0
⇒
θ i ′f e
∗( ) = ′c e
∗( )− c e∗( )− c e( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ ∂ p∂e∗ 1p
p
 (29) 
Note that since the left hand side of (29) is positive the right hand side 
by deduction also has to be positive. From expression (28) the 
proposition follows. 
QED. 
Proposition 8 thus stands in contrast to the discussion following Proposition 6, which 
suggested that workers would, under certain circumstances, want to reduce their effort in 
response to an increase in wages. Indeed, it offers a resolution to the problematic result, 
contrary to the central premise of the efficiency wage literature, that higher wages might in 
some situations induce lower effort. Proposition 8 states that firms will always set wages such 
that the positive efficiency wage correlation between wages and effort holds. There is, 
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however, no internal conflict between the conditions that underpin Proposition 6 and 
Proposition 8. Instead it is merely a reflection of profit maximisation, for whilst Proposition 6 
merely reflects supply responses, both demand and supply factors play a role in Proposition 8 
thus assuring the best possible outcome for the firm in terms of profit. Note that given 
Proposition 8, and given the close relationship between Proposition 6 and Proposition 7, it 
must also be true that the firm operates in a region where an increase in unemployment 
insurance will induce a decline in effort.  
This result is akin to the Stigler (1956) argument that a profit maximising monopolist 
should always operate at the elastic part of a monopolist’s demand curve. Our paper argues 
similarly, by implication of Propositions 6 and 8, that a profit maximising firm will operate 
where the elasticity of detection is not too elastic. Given the efficiency wage schedule in 
expression (16), it will never be optimal to operate in the region where an increase in wage 
yields a lower effort, as this would reduce profits. Thus, given Proposition 6, the firm should 
operate where the probability of detection is not too elastic with respect to non-shirkers’ 
effort. Proposition 8 shows formally that a profit maximising firm will always operate where 
an increase in wages yields larger levels of effort. 
3. Final Comments 
Our model as it stands illustrates a more nuanced picture regarding wages, effort and 
standards than previously acknowledged. Shirkers are no longer those workers who provide 
zero effort. They are instead those who neglect their duties by working less than required and 
who act rationally in so doing by trading off the cost of effort and the probability of detection. 
Thus, they work harder the higher the wage and the higher the standard set by the firm. By 
assuming continuous effort and endogenous detection, we identify conditions under which 
higher wages reduce effort whereas higher unemployment insurance increases effort, both of 
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which raise questions regarding the validity of the efficiency wage literature. We nevertheless 
offer a resolution to this set of two potentially disturbing results as our case is demonstrated 
to apply only to the supply side. For when we also take into account the demand side it 
becomes evident that the firm will always choose to to operate in the region where workers 
respond to higher wages or lower unemployment insurance by increasing effort.  
 Monitoring technology has been central to large swathes of the efficiency wage 
literature. And whilst there are good and natural reasons for this, a departure from a focus on 
monitoring to one where observable output is used as a signal for effort has allowed us to 
construct a stochastic efficiency wage model within which we can investigate the largely 
neglected connections between standards and efficiency wages. The model we have proposed 
is one in which workers face idiosyncratic shocks to their output. As such, it is natural that 
the firm should use absolute performance criteria when considering firing. Were we to alter 
this assumption and consider the case where shocks instead are common to all workers, it 
may be more appropriate to use relative performance measures, with a relatively poor 
performance by a worker being used as the trigger mechanism resulting in a dismissal. Whilst 
such ‘avoid the drop’ tournaments are worthy of further investigation, they have remained 
unexplored here and are instead left for future research.  
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 3 
The strict inequality e e∗<  follows by definition. The strict inequality 0e >  follows from first rewriting the 
expected utility from shirking as: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ), 1
L f e
Lf e
H L
u e e pb p w c e w b w c e
θ θ
θ θ
∗
∗
⎡ ⎤−⎢ ⎥= + − − = + − −⎢ ⎥−
⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (A1) 
The optimal level of shirking effort is derived from the first- and second-order conditions: 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )2
,
, 0Le
H L
u e e f ef epu e e b w c e b w c e
e e f e
θ
θ θ
∗ ∗
∗
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤∂ ′∂ ′ ′⎢ ⎥≡ = − − = − − − =⎢ ⎥
∂ ∂ −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 (A2) 
 
∂2u e ,e∗( )
∂e 2
≡ uee e ,e
∗( ) = ∂
2 p
∂e 2
b− w( )− ′′c e( ) = − ′′f e( ) f e( )− 2 ′f e( )
2
f e( )3
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
θL f e
∗( )
θH −θL( )
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
b− w( )− ′′c e( ) < 0  (A3) 
Since ( )
0
lim 0
e
f e
→
=  and ( )
0
lim
e
f e
→
′ = ∞ , then ( ) ( )2
0
lim
e
f e f e
→
⎡ ⎤′ =∞⎣ ⎦ . Given that ( )0lim 0e c e→ ′ =  we have: 
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )20
lim , 0Lee
H L
f ef e
u e e b w c e
f e
θ
θ θ
∗
∗
→
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤′
′⎢ ⎥= − − − >⎢ ⎥
−⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 (A4) 
Supplying zero effort is therefore not optimal. 
QED 
